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Ayako SUZUKI
Abstract
Using an empirical framework based on the bundling theory for a multi-
product monopolist, we estimate consumers’ preference distributions for bundles 
of cable television channels in the US cable television industry. The estimated 
distributions are then used to measure the extent of surplus extraction by a mo-
nopolist. In contrast to the theoretical predictions of studies such as Bakos and 
Brynjolfsson (1999), the surplus extraction does not increase with bundle size. 
This is because of the decreasing value of a television channel in a larger bundle, 
as suggested by Geng et al. (2005).
1. Introduction
In many markets, firms sell bundles of their differentiated products 
at fixed prices that do not depend on how many goods are actually used 
by buyers. Recent papers by Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) and Arm-
strong (1999) analyze the implication of bundling multiple goods, and 
find that bundling very large numbers of unrelated goods rather than 
selling them separately can be surprisingly profitable for a seller. They 
show that, under a very general set of conditions, a probability distribu-
tion of consumer valuation for a collection of goods has proportionately 
more mass near the mean, and hence, the seller is able to extract more 
of a consumer’s surplus than would be possible without bundling. A 
more recent study by Geng et al. (2005), however, shows that bundling 
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is not always superior for the seller even in the cases shown in previous 
studies, because the consumer’s valuation for a good in a bundle may 
decrease as the bundle size increases.
Using this bundling theory, this study estimates consumers’ valua-
tions for bundles of cable television channels in the US cable television 
industry. Cable television companies are mostly local monopolists. They 
bundle television channels and offer them to households in local cable 
television markets. Despite this practice and the theoretical potential 
of bundling for surplus extraction, the measure of its extent has rarely 
been examined. In this paper, we introduce an empirical framework 
that explicitly takes into account the power of bundling and estimate 
the parameters of the probability distributions of consumer valuation 
(preference distribution) for cable channel bundles in order to measure 
the extent of surplus extraction in each local cable market.
The preference distribution for a bundle varies across markets: 
firstly because consumers’ characteristics differ across markets; and 
secondly, because different portfolios of channels are offered in different 
markets. To separate these two sources of variation, we introduce two 
estimation steps. In the first step, we pool our market-level data so that 
each pool has markets that offer the same portfolio of channels. Nota-
bly, the only source now making the preference distribution vary across 
markets in each pool is consumer characteristics. We estimate the 
parameters of the preference distribution for a bundle in each pool con-
trolling for consumer characteristics. Having obtained the parameter 
values in each market for each pool, in the second stage, we examine to 
what extent variations in channel offerings across pools explain varia-
tions in consumer preferences.
Using the estimated preference distributions, we measure the ex-
tent of surplus extraction by a cable company in each local market. We 
found that the percentage of surplus extraction ranged from 13.7% to 
46.7% in most of the markets. As opposed to the prediction of bundling 
theories such as that of Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999), the extent of 
extraction does not increase with the bundle size. This is because of de-
creasing valuation of a channel, as suggested by Geng et al. (2005)—that 
267
Waseda Global Forum No. 6, 2009, 265–284
is, the mean valuation decreases with the bundle size.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we re-
view the bundling theory of a multiproduct monopolist, which forms the 
foundation of our empirical model. In Section 3, we describe the cable 
television industry and its bundling practice. This is followed in Section 
4 by a description of our data and empirical method. Section 5 presents 
the findings, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Bundling theory for price discrimination
Bundling has many potential benefits, including savings in produc-
tion and transaction costs, complementarities between the bundle com-
ponents, and reducing consumer heterogeneity on their valuation (see 
Varian (2003)). This study investigates the last incentive for bundling, 
heterogeneity reduction, in the US cable television industry.
The power of bundling exists on its ability to reduce consumer het-
erogeneity. For example, consider the case in which there are two class-
es of consumers and two different goods: good 1 and good 2.1 Type A 
consumers are willing to pay $120 for good 1 and $100 for good 2. Type 
B consumers have the opposite preference: they are willing to pay $120 
for good 2 and $100 for good 1. The marginal cost is negligible. Suppose 
that a monopolist sells each item separately. Then the profit maximiz-
ing policy is to set a price of $100 for each item and to receive a total 
profit of $400. Now suppose a monopolist bundles the items together. In 
this case, it could sell each bundle for $220, and receive a net profit of 
$440. By this way, bundling allows the monopolist to reduce preference 
heterogeneity and to extract all available consumers’ surplus. In gen-
eral, when bundle sales are preferred to component sales is dependent 
upon the extent of heterogeneity reduction and the level of marginal 
costs for components.
Figure 1, taken from Bakos and Brynjolfsson, presents the striking 
implication of the consequences of bundling for more than two goods 
when marginal costs are negligible. It presents the demand per good 
(for price per good) for a bundle of sizes 1, 2, and 20 for i.i.d. valua-
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tions (or willingness to pay (WTP)) that is uniformly distributed in [0,1] 
(i.e., linear demand for each component). When bundles are large, the 
law of large numbers operates—that is, the WTP distribution for the 
bundle becomes more concentrated around the mean as the bundle size 
increases. As a consequence, the seller can better extract the consumer 
surplus. Bakos and Brynjolfsson show that as the size goes to infinity, 
by setting the price equal to the mean value, the seller can extract the 
whole consumer surplus.
The example in Figure 1 assumes i.i.d. valuation and therefore, 
the mean valuation for each component is always identical. Geng et al. 
(2005), however, argue that consumers’ mean value for consuming a 
stream of goods declines with the number consumed, and argue that we 
should look at the coefficient of variation (the standard deviation over 
the mean) rather than variance to see the power of bundling. When the 
coefficient of variation is very small, consumers’ valuations are tightly 
concentrated around the mean, and the power of bundling is strong. 
However, if consumers’ values for subsequent goods decrease quickly, 
bundling a large number of goods becomes suboptimal because the coef-
ficient of variation may still be large despite the variance reduction.
3. Bundling in the US cable television industry
3.1. Bundling in the industry
The cable television industry is divided into a number of indepen-
dent local markets, where one or two cable television companies operate 
to distribute cable television channels.2 Cable companies offer bundles 
of cable television channels as services; most offer tiers of services. 
The largest service (tier) is called basic service, and contains broadcast 
channels and basic cable programming channels. Most cable companies 
also offer larger basic services, called expanded basic services, which 
contain some extra basic programming channels in addition to the basic 
service. There are also premium services, made up of premium pro-
gramming channels, which are offered on a stand-alone basis although 
consumers must purchase a basic service in order to purchase any pre-
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mium services. In addition, consumers can purchase on demand a par-
ticular program as part of a pay-per-view service. Cable companies thus 
have two instruments at their disposal with respect to bundle market-
ing: decisions related to tiering, i.e., how many, if any, expanded basic 
services are offered; and carriage, i.e., what channels to offer. Their 
marketing decisions vary across cable companies though all companies 
offer a basic service, and the majority also offers at least one expanded 
service. The summary statistics for the bundle types are shown in Table 
1. It shows the bundle types, the average number of channels in each 
service, and the number of local markets that offer each service.
Such a specific feature of the industry’s observed bundling practice 
is explained by a few existing studies. For example, the existence of 
multiple bundles of basic channels (i.e., basic service and expanded ba-
sic services) can be explained as being a result of a sorting of consumers 
as is discussed in the monopoly nonlinear pricing literature (Crawford 
and Shum (forthcoming)). The reason premium channels are sold sepa-
rately from basic and expanded basic services may be the high cost of 
premium channels. As discussed, the benefit of bundling depends on 
the level of marginal costs for components. Because bundling requires 
consumers to purchase all goods in a bundle, some below-cost sales of 
components can result, reducing the gains from bundling. This is more 
likely when the marginal costs for the components are high. It is thus 
more beneficial to unbundle high-cost premium programming channels 
and sell them separately with independent prices. The reason for the 
existence of pay-per-view services is explained in Bakos and Brynjolfs-
son (1999). They argue that such a program such as a prizefight should 
be sold separately with an independent high price because a small frac-
tion of consumers have a very high willingness to pay for it.
3.2. The existing empirical literature
Crawford (2005) empirically examines the incentive to bundle in 
the cable television industry. As explained above, there exist multiple 
incentives for a seller to bundle their products. He tests which incentive 
can best describe the bundling practice in this industry. Specifically, he 
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tests the unique implication of the heterogeneity reduction incentives—
wherein the preferences for bundles become more concentrated with 
increases in bundle size. The natural measure of preference variation is 
the coefficient of variation (CV), the standard deviation over the mean. 
Because decreasing the CV increases the demand elasticity at the 
profit-maximizing point for all but very small values of the CV, he tests 
whether the bundle demand curve becomes more elastic as the bundle 
size increases. He finds strong support for the heterogeneity reduction 
theory. His result suggests that adding nine of the top 15 cable televi-
sion channels to bundles significantly increase the elasticity of cable 
demand. The present study differs from Crawford (2005); whereas he 
tests the heterogeneity reduction theory, we use the theory as an as-
sumption in the model. Inasmuch as Crawford finds strong support 
for the theory, it may be considered that using this assumption in our 
study is supported by his result.
4. Data and estimation strategy
4.1 Data
We use two data sources: for the data for cable companies, the 
Television and Cable Factbook (1996) produced by Warren Publishing 
Inc.; and for consumers’ income data, the census in the County and City 
Data Book (1994). The Television and Cable Factbook consists of infor-
mation on all the cable companies that existed in 1995. This amounts to 
over 11,000 companies in the sample. Our data set is company-level as 
well as local market-level because only one company operates in most of 
the local markets. After excluding observations missing necessary infor-
mation, 7,910 companies remain in our data set for the estimation. We 
merge county-level income information with this market-level data. We 
obtain the data for the median family money income and the percentag-
es of households with income of less than $15,000, between $15,000 and 
$25,000, between $25,000 and $35,000, between $35,000 and $75,000, 
and $75,000 or more. From these, we calculate the mean and the vari-
ance of the income distribution. The summary statistics are shown in 
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Table 2. The first set of variables consists of the characteristics of the 
largest bundle in each cable market (i.e., each cable company). Fee 
refers to the monthly fee for the largest bundle. Market share is calcu-
lated as the number of subscribers for the largest bundle divided by the 
number of homes that have access to cable services. Bundle size is the 
number of cable channels in the largest bundle. CSPAN, CNN, Discov-
ery, ESPN, Family, Lifetime, Nashville, TNT, USA and WTBS are all 
indicator variables of the top 10 channels, which take the value 1 if the 
channel is in the largest bundle. See the description of the top 10 chan-
nels in Table 3.
As explained in the next section, our estimation methods consist of 
two steps. In the first step, we pool the observations according to the 
portfolio of the channels in the largest bundle. After pooling, in order to 
obtain better estimates, we exclude those pools that have less than 20 
observations. Seventy-four pools then remain with a total of 3,428 ob-
servations. The bundle size varies from 1 to 30. In Table 4, we show the 
summary statistics of the largest pool. The largest pool is Pool 29 with 
206 observations, implying that this portfolio of cable television chan-
nels is the most common. In the markets in this pool, a bundle that con-
sists of 12 channels is offered with, on average, a price of $27.70. The 
average market share in these markets is rather small, at 0.42.
4.2 Estimation strategy
This study estimates consumers’ valuation for a bundle of cable 
channels using bundling theory. We estimate the parameters of the 
preference distribution for a bundle in each local cable market. The 
preference distribution for a bundle varies across markets, firstly be-
cause consumers’ characteristics differ across markets, and secondly be-
cause different portfolios of channels are offered in a bundle in different 
markets. To separate these two sources of variation, in the first step of 
estimation, we pool our market-level data so that in each pool, we have 
markets that offer the same portfolio of channels. This means that the 
only source of variation in the preference distributions across markets 
in a pool is the variation in consumers’ characteristics. In each pool, we 
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estimate the parameters of the preference distribution for a bundle con-
trolling for consumers’ characteristics across markets. Specifically, we 
consider the income distribution in a market to constitute consumers’ 
characteristics, as heterogeneity in income is usually considered as the 
main source of heterogeneity in consumers’ WTP. Having estimated the 
preference distribution for a bundle in each market in each pool, in the 
second stage, we examine to what extent variation in channel offerings 
across pools explain variation in consumer preferences.
Consider a local cable market m where a cable company m operates. 
Suppose that cable company m supplies Nm discrete cable channels in a 
bundle to a set of consumers Ωm. For each consumer ω ∈ Ωm, let Uni(ω) 
denote the valuation of a good i where a total of n goods are in a bundle. 
We allow Uni to depend on n so that the distributions of valuation for in-
dividual goods can change as the number of goods purchased change. In 
this way, it is able to reflect the argument of Geng et al. (2005) concern-
ing decreasing valuation. Such a collection of random variables Un1(ω), 
Un2(ω),...,Unn(ω) are denoted by Vn and referred to as a triangular array:
　      U11(ω)
Vn(ω) =    U21(ω)  U22(ω)
　 　 　 　 　 … 　 　 　   …
　　　   Un1(ω)  Un2(ω)...  Unn(ω)  .
We assume that the joint distribution of these valuations for the 
components of a bundle of size n is multivariate normal, and that pref-
erences are additively separable. Specifically, we assume that the dis-
tribution of consumer valuations Un1(ω), Un2(ω), ... ,Unn(ω) are normally 
distributed with means E[Uni(ω)]=μni, variances V[Uni(ω)]=б2ni, and corre-
lations corr(Un1(ω), Unk(ω))=ρnlk 
A
l, k ∈ 1, ... n, 1 ≠ k, and the valuation of 
a bundle of size n for consumer ω is Un,bun(ω)=∑ni=1Uni(ω). Then in a mar-
ket m with Nm cable channels supplied, consumer ω’s valuation for a 
bundle is also normally distributed with mean and variance as follows:
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μNm, bun =∑ Nm     μNmi(ω), 
б2Nm, bun = Var (UNm, bun(ω))
= Var ( ∑ Nm     μNm,i(ω)),
=∑ Nm     б2Nmi+ 2∑ 
Nm
     ∑      Nm          PNmil бNmi бNm1 .
Now let U– Nm(ω) = Nm1  UNm, bun be the per-good valuation of consumer 
ω for a bundle. Then it is also normally distributed and the mean and 
the variance of the per-good valuation are given as:
μ– Nm(ω) = Nm1  μNm, bun, (1)
б– 2Nm(ω) = Nm
1
 2 б2Nm, bun, (2)
The variance of the per-good valuation for the bundle equals 1/Nm 
times the average variance. As the law of large number shows, this 
drives the more concentrated per-good preferences of the larger size of 
the bundles, as shown in Figure 1.
Now let p–m represent the per-good price of a bundle in market m. 
Consumers then purchase a bundle of size Nm if and only if U– Nm ≥ p–m. Using 
the assumption of a normal distribution with the mean and the vari-
ance in equations (1) and (2), the market share sm of a bundle of size Nm 
can be expressed as:
sm = prob(U– Nm ≥ p–m) = 1−Φ(p–m│μ– Nm, б– 2Nm), (3)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of normal distribu-
tion. We estimate the mean and variance in equation (3) for each mar-
ket given the observed market share, price and the number of channels 
in a bundle.
i=1
i=1
i=1+1i=1
i=1
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Step 1
We estimate equation (3) using the observed market share, per-
channel price, and the number of channels in a bundle in each market. 
The parameters to be estimated include μ– Nm, and б– Nm. However, these 
parameter values differ in each market depending on consumer char-
acteristics and on which cable channels are offered in a bundle in each 
market. Correspondingly, in the first step, we pool the markets accord-
ing to the channels offered in a bundle. This is done in order to isolate 
the latter determinant of the parameters—that is, we pool the data so 
that the same portfolio of channels is offered in every market in each 
pool and every market that offers the same portfolio is in the same pool.
In each pool, the only item that makes the mean and the variance 
of the preference distribution for a bundle vary across markets in a pool 
is the variation in consumers’ characteristics. In this study, we consider 
the income distribution in a market as indicative of consumers’ char-
acteristics because heterogeneity in WTP is often thought to be driven 
by heterogeneity in income, and thus cannot be ignored. We specifically 
assume that the mean and the variance of the income distribution lin-
early affect the mean and the variance of the preference distribution, 
respectively. Then we estimate equation (3) using market share data, 
per-channel price, the number of channels in a bundle, and the mean 
and the variance of the income distribution in each market for each 
pool. Having estimated the mean and the variance in each market for 
each pool, we also calculate the coefficient of variation, 
б– mp
μ– mp  and con-
sumer surplus. Firm surplus is also calculated using the cable channel 
license fee for each channel in a bundle as a constant marginal cost for 
the  channel.3
During this step, we make two simplifications. First, we only use 
the largest bundle in each market for the estimation. This is usually 
the largest expanded basic service bundle. Although this simplification 
wastes additional information, finding markets that offer exactly the 
same tiers of the same services decreases the number of observations 
in a pool significantly. Therefore, we use this simplification. The second 
simplification is that, for a pooling, we only identify the top 10 chan-
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nels—that is, we put markets in the same pool if they offer the same 
portfolio of top 10 channels and the same number of additional chan-
nels. This is the same as assuming that nontop 10 channels have an 
identical preference distribution. This simplification was needed, again, 
to maintain a certain number of observations in a pool. Furthermore, 
we do not count the number of broadcast channels in a bundle size, as 
its access is free of charge.
Step 2
The second step is to explain variation in preference distributions 
across pools. We examine to what extent variations in channel offerings 
across pools explain variations in the mean and variance estimated in 
the first step. Specifically, we regress the estimated mean and the vari-
ance by indicator variables of top 10 channels and the bundle size. The 
detailed specifications on the regressions are available in Suzuki (2006).
5. Findings
Step 1
The results of the first step of our empirical procedure yield the 
parameters in the mean and the variance equations for each pool. As 
space is limited, we only show the implied mean and variance values 
for Pool 1 and Pool 74, the pools with bundle size 1 and 30, in Table 
5. Standard errors are obtained by 1,000 bootstrap subsamples. The 
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level in almost all the 
pools. The detailed results are available upon request. We can see that, 
as in bundling theory, the variance of the WTP for the larger bundle is 
much smaller than that for the small bundle. The variance is 223.51 for 
a bundle of size 1 in Pool 1 and decreases to 10.22 for a bundle of size 
30 in Pool 74. The mean of WTP shows an interesting tendency. Con-
sumers value one cable channel in a bundle of size 1 at $17.91 in Pool 1, 
while they value one channel in a bundle of size 30 at $2.22 in Pool 74.
Figure 2 plots the implied mean and variance for each market 
against bundle sizes. It can be seen that the variance of consumers’ 
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preference distribution declines with bundle size, as suggested by 
bundling theories. Variance reduction seems to occur as the bundle 
size decreases. Variance is 223.5 for a bundle of size 1 in Pool 1 and 
decreases to 19.57 for a bundle of size 4 in Pool 5. After that, variance 
stays around 10, even when the bundle size increases from 5 to 30. The 
average (per-good) means of the preference distributions show the same 
tendency: as the bundle size increases, the average mean decreases, 
and the speed is fast when the bundle size is small.
The decreasing mean valuation may have an important implication. 
Geng et al. (2005) concludes that the optimality of bundling depends 
on the speed at which valuation decreases. If consumers’ valuations 
decrease quickly, one should expect bundling to be suboptimal. This is 
because the speed of decrease in the mean and the variance determines 
the coefficient of variation. When the coefficient of variation is very 
small, consumers’ valuations are tightly concentrated around the mean, 
and there is strong power of bundling through heterogeneity reduction. 
Adding an additional good to a bundle is not always beneficial to the 
seller if the mean decreases  more quickly than the variance.
Using the estimated parameters, we can recover the demand func-
tion, or equation (3). Using this demand function, we can calculate con-
sumer surplus (per channel per consumer) using the observed price in 
each market. Furthermore, using the published cable channel license 
fee for each cable channel as the marginal cost of offering the channel, 
we calculate firm surplus in each market.4 We find that the percentage 
of surplus extraction by a cable company (firm surplus/total surplus) 
ranges from 13.7% to 46.7% in most of the markets. Figure 3 shows the 
box plots of the coefficient of variation and the percentage of surplus 
extraction by a cable company with the bundle size. The coefficient of 
variation, in fact, does not exhibit a decreasing tendency with bundle 
size. Therefore, unlike what is predicted by Bakos and Brynjolfsson, in 
the case of the cable television industry, adding an additional television 
channel does not always reduce heterogeneity, and surplus extraction 
by a monopolist cannot be easily achieved.
277
Waseda Global Forum No. 6, 2009, 265–284
Step 2
In the second step, we regress the estimated mean and variance on 
indicator variables of the top 10 channels and the bundle size. All the 
variables in the two equations are statistically significant at the 5 % 
level, except Family and Lifetime channels in the mean equation. The 
detailed results from these regressions are available in Suzuki (2006).
Using the estimated coefficients of the top 10 channels and the 
bundle size, we calculate the pseudo mean and variance values of vari-
ous bundles with different portfolio and bundles sizes to calculate the 
coefficients of variation of these bundles. In Figure 3, we saw that the 
coefficients of variation do not decrease with the bundle size, implying 
that adding an extra channel does not necessarily decrease heterogene-
ity. This time, we look at the effect of each channel on such a tendency.
We found that if the bundle size increases from 1 to 30 and all the 
channels in the bundles are nontop 10 channels, the coefficient of varia-
tion increases until bundle size 11 and decreases thereafter. This is 
because the speed of the decreasing mean valuation is initially fast, and 
becomes moderate later. The coefficient of variation is smallest when 
the bundle size is 1, implying that there is little heterogeneity reduction 
caused by bundling of nontop 10 channels. As for the top 10 channels, 
we found that adding WTBS, ESPN, TNT, the Family, and Nashville 
channels (to the bundle of nontop 10 channels) reduces the coefficient 
of variation for most sizes of bundles. The reduction effects of WTBS 
and ESPN are especially outstanding. Adding these two channels re-
duces the coefficient of variation even when the bundle size is relatively 
small, while the reduction effect is negligible for the cases of the other 
three channels when the bundle size is small. The effect of WTBS seems 
to come from its high mean valuation, while that of ESPN is derived 
from its low variance. It is interesting to note that WTBS and ESPN 
are in practice the most likely to be included in the basic bundle when 
the bundle size is small. Our data set shows that 86.15%, 86.99%, and 
91.00% of markets that offer bundles of sizes 2, 4, and 5, respectively, 
include WTBS, while 20.00%, 82.19%, and 86.16% of markets include 
ESPN. These numbers are much lower for the other top 10 channels. 
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This could be interpreted as suggesting that cable companies recognize 
the heterogeneity reduction effect by WTBS and ESPAN, and therefore 
are encouraged to carry these two channels.
6. Conclusion
Using an empirical framework based on bundling theory for a 
multiproduct monopolist, we estimated consumers’ preference distribu-
tions in the US cable television industry. We introduced an empirical 
framework that explicitly takes into account the power of bundling with 
respect to heterogeneity reduction, and estimate the parameters of con-
sumers’ preference distributions for bundles in order to measure the 
extent of surplus extraction in each local cable television market.
We find that the percentage of surplus extraction ranges from 13% 
to 46%. In contrast to the prediction of such bundling theories as that of 
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999), the surplus extraction does not increase 
with bundle size. This is because of decreasing valuation, as suggested 
by Geng et al. (2005). The valuation for a channel decreases by about 
87% when the bundle size increases from 1 to 30.
We also examined the effect of the top 10 television channels on 
heterogeneity reduction. WTBS and ESPN are found to be especially 
successful at heterogeneity reduction, and such findings are strength-
ened by the observed high likelihood of these channels being included 
in services.
　　　　　　　　　
1 This example is taken from Varian (2003). 
2 Cable television channels consist of four types: Broadcast channels are signals broadcast 
over the air by television stations and collected and retransmitted by cable companies. 
Examples of this are ABC, CBS, NBC, and FOX. Basic cable programming channels are 
advertising-supported channels distributed to companies via satellite. Examples include 
CNN and TBS. Premium programming channels are advertising-free channels, such as 
HBO and Showtime. Finally, there are Pay-Per-View channels that are specialty chan-
nels devoted to on-demand viewing of programs. 
3 The detailed estimation functions for the mean and the variance of preference distribu-
tion and their results are available in Suzuki (2006).
4 License fees are collected from Kagan Associates Inc., 2000, “Kagan’s Economics of Ba-
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sic Cable Channels.”
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Figure 1: Demand for bundles 1, 2, and 20 goods with i.i.d. valuations 
uniformly distributed in [0,1]. Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999).
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Figure 2: Implied mean (left) and variance (right) of per-good 
preference distributions
Figure 3: Coefficient of variation (left) and surplus extraction by a cable 
company (right) with bundle size
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Bundle type Size Number of markets 
Basic bundle 11.98 8110 
Expanded basic 1 14.70 2132 
Expanded basic 2 12.13 291 
Expanded basic 3 11.99 7 
Expanded basic 4 11.98 1 
The largest bundle 14.74 8110 
Table 1: Bundle types, the number of channels in each service, and the 
number of markets that offer each service
Variable Mean S.D. 
Characteristics of the largest bundle 
Fee 18.76 5.31 
Market share 0.63 0.38 
Bundle size 14.92 7.66 
CSPAN 0.25 0.43 
CNN 0.75 0.44 
Discovery 0.62 0.49 
ESPN 0.89 0.32 
Family 0.72 0.46 
Lifetime 0.37 0.48 
Nashville 0.71 0.46 
TNT 0.61 0.49 
USA 0.78 0.42 
WTBS 0.71 0.46 
Consumer characteristics 
Log (mean income) 9.96 0.24 
Log (s.d. income) 9.87 0.09 
# of observations 7910 
Table 2: Summary statistics
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Rank Channel Subscribers 
(millions) 
Programming 
format 
1 TBS superstation 77.0 General interest 
2 Discovery Channel 76.4 Nature 
3 ESPN 76.2 Sports 
4 USA Channel 75.8 General interest 
5 C-SPAN 75.7 Public affairs 
6 TNT 75.6 General interest 
7 FOX Family Channel 74.0 General interest/kids 
8 TNT 74.0 General interest/country 
9 Lifetime Television 73.4 Women’s 
10 CNN 73.0 News 
Table 3: Top 10 cable channels
Variable Mean S.D. 
Characteristics of the largest bundle 
Fee 27.70 3.29 
Market share 0.42 0.15 
Bundle size 12.0 0 
Consumer characteristics 
Log (mean income) 9.97 0.20 
Log (s.d. income) 9.87 0.07 
# of observations 206 
Table 4: Summary statistics of the largest pool
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 Implied 
mean 
Implied 
variance 
Bundle size
Pool 1 17.91** 
(1.28) 
223.51** 
(0.40) 
1 
Pool 74 2.22** 
(0.28) 
10.22** 
(0.07) 
30 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates statistical signifi-
cance at the 1% level. Standard errors are bootstrap standard errors. 
Table 5: Implied mean and variance of consumers’ WTP distribution in 
the smallest and the largest pools
